

FOCUS

TAJDĪD, IŞLĀḤ AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL IN ISLAM

*Mohammad Hashim Kamali**

Abstract: The basic theme of this article is that civilisational renewal is an integral part of Islamic thought. The article looks into the meaning, definition and origins of *tajdīd*, *işlāḥ* and their relationship with *ijtihād*, and how these have been manifested in the writings and contributions of the thought leaders of Islam throughout its history. The article develops *tajdīd*-related formulas and guidelines that should lead the efforts of contemporary Muslims in articulating the objectives of inter-civilisational harmony and their cooperation for the common good.

Introduction and Summary

The history of Islamic thought is marked by a continuous tradition of internal revitalisation and reform embedded in the principles of *işlāḥ*, and *tajdīd*. The ultimate purpose has been to bring existing realities and social change in line with the transcendent and universal standard of the Qur'an and Sunnah through a process of restoration and reform. The tradition of *işlāḥ-tajdīd* has thus consistently challenged the Muslim status quo and prompted fresh interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah, understood and implemented through the methodologies of interpretation and *ijtihād*, as well as rejection of unwarranted accretions to the original message of Islam.¹

This article is presented in two parts, the first consists of an analysis of *tajdīd*, its definition and scope, its textual origins and the impact of scholastic developments thereon. The second part turns to *işlāḥ* in conjunction with Islamic revivalist movements, interaction and responses to western modernity and secularism. Western challenges to Islam have also prompted new and more inquisitive approaches to *işlāḥ* and *tajdīd*. A brief discussion that ensues also explores the relevance of *maqāsid* to *işlāḥ* and *tajdīd*, to be followed by an overview of the Western critique and responses it has received from Muslim thinkers. The final section addresses the question as to how civilisational renewal (*al-tajdīd al-ḥaḍārī*) is to be understood in its Islamic context. The article ends with a conclusion and some actionable recommendations.

Meaning and Scope

Tajdīd literally means renewal, when something is made or becomes new, and when it is restored to its original condition. Renewal as such takes for granted the occurrence of some change in the subject matter to which it is applied: Something is known to have existed in an original state, then it became overwhelmed by factors that changed it. When it is restored to how it was prior to that change, that is *tajdīd*.² It thus appears that *tajdīd* also takes for granted the existence of a valid precedent, a principle or body of principles that fell prey to distortion and neglect, and need to be restored to their original purity. *Tajdīd* is not necessarily concerned with new beginnings and new principles, yet as will be seen below, the task of renewal and *tajdīd* does not lend itself to overly restrictive applications nor to a mere revival of past precedent. Recourse to *tajdīd* is therefore likely to acquire different dimensions as I elaborate below.

Muslim scholars have recorded a variety of definitions for *tajdīd*, some of which are closely tied to precedent whereas others tend to be more open. The earliest definition on record of *tajdīd* is that of Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (d. 124AH/724CE) who wrote that *tajdīd* in the *ḥadīth* (as reviewed below) “means revival (*iḥyāʾ*) of that which has disappeared or died out due to neglect of the Qurʾan and Sunnah and their requirements.”³ Ibn al-Athir’s (d. 606AH/12CE) definition of *tajdīd* reflects more on scholastic developments which were well-developed by his time. *Tajdīd* is accordingly equated with the revival (*iḥyāʾ*) of the legacy of the leading *madhāhib*. The *mujaddid*, or carrier of *tajdīd*, is thus described as “a prominent leader who emerges at the head of every century to revive the religion for the *ummah* and preserve the *madhhabs* of their following under the leadership of their respective imams.”⁴ On a broader note, al-Suyuti (d.911/1505) wrote that “*tajdīd* in religion means renewal of its guidance, explanation of its truth, as well as eradication of pernicious innovation (*bidʿah*), of extremism (*al-ghuluw*) or laxity in religion.” He went on to add that *tajdīd* also means “observance of people’s benefits, societal traditions and the norms of civilisation and *Sharīʿah*.”⁵

Writing in the late 20th century, al-Qaraḍāwī understands *tajdīd* as “combining the beneficial old with the appropriate new – *al-qadīm al-nāfiʾ waʾl-jadīd al-ṣāliḥ*,” and being “open to the outside world without melting into it.” He juxtaposed *tajdīd* with *ijtihād* and added that “*ijtihād* captures the intellectual and knowledge dimensions of *tajdīd*, but that *tajdīd* is wider in the sense that *tajdīd* also encapsulates the psychological and practical dimensions [of revival].”⁶ Hence *ijtihād* and *tajdīd* are about the same on the intellectual plane, but *tajdīd* has an emotive component that is manifested in collective activism and movement. Many of Qaraḍāwī’s contemporaries went on record to endorse him: Kamal Abul Majd, Munir Shafiq, Umar Ubaid Hasanah and Fathi al-Darini

- to name a few.⁷ Hasan al-Turabi is openly critical, on the other hand, of those who confined *tajdīd* to the revival of the spirit of religiosity and theological doctrines only. For *tajdīd* may well consist of individual or collective *ijtihād* in theoretical and practical matters, or may indeed visualise a new prototype that unites the timeless guidelines of *Shari‘ah* with a new reality and circumstance.⁸ Turabi added further that religious *tajdīd* has two aspects, one that looks at the *Shari‘ah* from within and consists essentially of its revival (*iḥyā’*), whereas the other stretches the perimeters by bringing in new elements that may partake in *taṭwīr li’l-dīn*, that is, diversification of the resources of religion. *Tajdīd* is further extended to mean a “total revival in all aspects,” including the area of political reform by devising a mechanism for a *shūrā* based system of governance.⁹

Understanding *tajdīd* and what it has meant to commentators has thus been influenced by various factors, one of which is historical in that challenges faced by people and societies in various periods of history are evidently not the same. This also implies that people tended to interpret *tajdīd* in the light of their own experience and conditions. Another factor is the interpreter’s viewpoint and specialisation. A jurist may understand *tajdīd* differently from a historian or a sociologist. The prevalence of imitation or *taqlīd* over many centuries is yet another factor affecting the understanding of *tajdīd*.¹⁰ The time factor is evidently important for *tajdīd*: reading the views of a 20th century scholar or *faqīh* may well provide a different vision of *tajdīd* compared to his earlier counterparts. This is partly because *tajdīd* is inherently dynamic and multi-dimensional, and can tie up with many other ideas and principles. A comprehensive reading of *tajdīd* is also likely to go beyond a strictly theological framework and touch on issues of concern to the renewal of Islamic society and civilisation.¹¹ In Muhammad ‘Imarah’s view, since the *ummah* is faced with a crisis in its encounter with modernity, it is most likely that *tajdīd* reads the scripture in conjunction with a new reality through the lenses of rationality and *ijtihād*.¹²

A reference may be made to two other Arabic expressions that occur in the Islamic reformist discourse, namely *al-taghyīr* and *al-taṭwīr*. *Al-taghyīr* (change) could either mean regeneration and renewal of what had existed before, which is tantamount to *tajdīd*, or it could mean seeking to change the status quo without reference to a precedent, which is *taṭwīr*. Both of these partake in gradual reconstruction and reform, but if the change is sudden and unprecedented, it would then qualify as *thawrah/inqilāb* (revolution). Some change may consist, in addition, of purification and the purging of unwanted accretions that originate in questionable practices in the name of religion – this would most likely be in the nature of *al-tanqīh* (lit. purification, purging) and not of renewal as such.¹³ That said, no black and white categories can be visualised as in reality, many of these concepts partake of one another and overlap.

Another related word already mentioned is *ihyā'* (revival), which evidently means restoring *status quo ante* without necessarily any attempt to improve or reform it. Some authors have, however, used *ihyā'* in a generic sense that did not preclude renewal and reform. This may be said of Imam al-Ghazali's (d.1111CE) renowned work, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (revival of the religious sciences), whereas the Prominent Indian author, Wahiduddin Khan's choice of *Tajdīd 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (renewal of the religious sciences) for his well-known book is actually meant, on the other hand, to convey the notion only of revival (*ihyā'*) rather than that of *tajdīd*. Jala al-Dīn al-Suyuti has used *tajdīd* in his writings in the sense mainly, however, of *ijtihād*. Two well-known works of twentieth century origin on *tajdīd* that merit attention are that of the Egyptian 'Abd al-Muatta'al al-Sa'idi's *Al-Mujaddidūn fi'l-Islām*, and that of Muhammad Iqbal's *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, both of which presented the various aspects of *tajdīd*.¹⁴ Other authors who have contributed to the *tajdīd* discourse in recent times include, apart from Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, Yusuf al-Qaradawī, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Abu'l A'la Maududī, Hasan al-Turabi, Isma'il Raji al-Faruqī, Fazlur Rahman, Taha Jabir al-'Alwani and many others. While one would hesitate to identify them as *mujaddidūn* in the traditional sense, yet there is little doubt of their substantive contribution of ideas to that effect. Then it appears that the conventional notion of *tajdīd* itself has been changing, perhaps with the advent of globalisation, the sheer bulk and rapidity of ideas and contributions.¹⁵

A brief mention may also be made of the Arabic words *al-naḥdah* and *al-ṣaḥwah* (awakening, resurgence), which tend to signify movement and a demand for change. Some movements using these words in their mottos call for a total revival of the past heritage, whereas others are critical of modernity and westernisation, but still others take a more balanced view of *tajdīd*.¹⁶

Due to its inherent dynamism, *tajdīd* has hardly been subjected to a pre-determined methodology and framework, which would explain, to some extent, why Muslim scholars have frequently underlined their concern over the Islamic authenticity of what can be rightly subsumed under it. "The true *mujaddid* (renewer) is one", according to al-Qaraḏāwī, "who rejuvenates religion by the religion itself. *Tajdīd* through syncretism and implantation of what has no basis in the religion does not qualify as *tajdīd*."¹⁷ Yet al-Qaraḏāwī also refutes the assertion by some that the religion, its tenets and principles are not open to *tajdīd* – saying that while Islam is open to *tajdīd* by the authority of a clear text, it would be incorrect to change the essential pillars and beliefs of Islam in the name of *tajdīd*.¹⁸ Outside this particular framework, in other words, Islam remains open to *tajdīd* in all areas.

The need for *tajdīd* is accentuated by both the norm and praxis. At a certain

stage of its development, the community's touch with the original impulse and premises of Islam may be weakened, or even lost, under the strains of challenging conditions – such as *taqlīd*, colonialism, rampant secularism, and globalisation – as already mentioned.

Islam's long history has undoubtedly witnessed instances of both rejuvenating *tajdīd*, and of deadening stagnation and *taqlīd*. The weight of unwarranted accretions even managed to declare, at some point, the door of creative thinking and *ijtihād* closed. Hence the community's need for inspiring thinkers and *mujaddids* in the persons of such luminaries as Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī; Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) with his innovative contributions on the higher purposes, or *maqāsid*, of *Sharī'ah*; Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the harbinger of political revival; the polymaths of civilisational renewal, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) and Shāh Walī Allaāh Dihlawī (d. 1762), and many more. Some have even cited Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 1193) as a *mujaddid* of a different kind.

A point may be made also regarding information overload. Generations upon generations of scholars have added their personal deductions and interpretations to the original teachings of the religion, which may well have had the unwanted effect of making the religion more complicated and remote from the common man. Instead of knowing the teachings of religion as the predecessors did, through direct personal insight, the common man is often placed in a position to rely on second-hand expositions offered by people who have specialised in the study of some aspects of Islam. The opinions of these mediators naturally differ and verification of the correct positions often requires a great amount of learned labour, resulting in further additions to the original message. Direct contact and awareness of Muslims of the essence of Islam is consequently supplanted by elaborate rules and burdensome extrapolations.

Textual Origins of *Tajdīd*

Tajdīd originates in the authority of a renowned *ḥadīth* that has been carefully analysed and interpreted by its learned commentators. To quote the *ḥadīth*: “God will raise for this *ummah*, at the head of each century, someone who will rejuvenate for them their religion – *inna 'Llāh yab'ath li-hādhihi 'l-ummah 'alā ra's kull mi'ah sanah man yujaddid lahā dīnahā*.¹⁹

The key word here is *yujaddid* from the verbal root, *jaddada*, which means to renew something. *Mujaddid*, being its active participle, refers to one who renews or revives the application of Islam in the Muslim community. *Tajdīd* accordingly implies renewal and regeneration of the application of Islam in society, returning it to the path of Islam anew, as it was originally.²⁰ The emphasis is on the revival of Islamic tenets and principles that have been neglected, marginalised or

forgotten under the weight of new conditions and developments. Restoring and disseminating the purity of those principles among people and their acting upon them is the main task of the *mujaddid*.²¹ According to a *ḥadīth* commentator, “*Tajdīd* means revival of what has been marginalised of the Qur’an and Sunnah and issuance of judgment on their basis as well as eradicating pernicious innovation (*bid’ah*) that contravenes the established Sunnah.”²² This definition seems to correspond with that of al-Zuhri’s, as earlier quoted, albeit with minor additions – as discussed later. Further commenting on the *ḥadīth* under review, al-Manāwī (d. 1621 CE) added that “*yujaddid lahā dīnahā*” means that the *mujaddid* clarifies and differentiates the Sunnah from that which is pernicious innovation and *bid’ah*, and he fights it.²³

Commentators have further added that the message of this *ḥadīth* tends to go beyond its literal meaning: it is basically to accentuate the need for renewal, interpretation and *ijtihād* on unprecedented issues and developments that the *ummah* may encounter over time.²⁴ In juridical matters of concern to the *Sharī’ah*, *tajdīd* is akin to *ijtihād* and should therefore be regulated by the methodological guidelines of *ijtihād*. It is widely acknowledged that *ijtihād* is Islam’s principal tool of constructive regeneration and renewal, which may well consist of *tajdīd*, yet the two technically differ in that *ijtihād* proceeds mainly in conjunction with practical *fiqhī* matters, legal and juridical issues, whereas *tajdīd* is not so confined and extends to all aspects of the religion, indeed to the life of the *ummah*, its ethos, lifestyle and civilisation. Briefly, *ijtihād* may be divided into two types: creative (*inshā’ī*), and clarificatory (*intiḳā’ī*), both of which must contain an element of originality, and a fresh understanding of the source guidelines in order to qualify as *ijtihād*.

The *ḥadīth* under review is also understood to mean that Islam will not die nor become redundant and that God will help this *ummah* to reconnect with the original messages of Islam. The *ḥadīth* is similarly understood to be conveying a message of hope and assurance that God will help this *ummah* to be on the right path and find its bearings with its past heritage to face new challenges.²⁵

The *mujaddid* must possess certain qualifications that include: 1) a clear understanding of the changeable and unchangeable in Islam. The unchangeable in Islam refers to the essentials of belief, worship and morality, as well as its decisive scriptural injunctions. Islamic principles in the sphere of civil transactions (*mu’āmalāt*) are, on the other hand, open to interpretation and adjustment. 2) Knowledge of the rules of necessity and *Sharī’ah* concessions (*darūrah*, *rukhsah*) pertaining to exceptional circumstances. 3) Knowledge of the place of rationality and ratiocination (*ta’līl*) in the understanding of scripture. 4) Due regard for *maṣlahah* and people’s legitimate interests. 5) Due observance of the general customs of society.²⁶

The fact that the *ḥadīth* under review refers to *mujaddid* in the singular, does not necessarily mean emergence only of one *mujaddid* at any given place or century. This is because the Arabic pronoun ‘man’ therein can refer to one person or to a multitude. *Tajdīd* may accordingly be attempted by one person or a group of persons, party or movement. Notwithstanding the emergence of individual *mujaddids* that featured prominently in the writings of early commentators, modern interpretations of *tajdīd* favour collective *tajdīd* undertaken by groups of ‘*ulamā*’, specialists and scholars in various disciplines. One *mujaddid* may be a jurist, another a political scientist, yet another an economist and so forth. Under the present circumstances, *tajdīd* and its allied concept of *islāh* (which see below) are both movement-oriented and their combined impact on both the inner life of individuals and their collective action tend to acquire renewed prominence in modern times.²⁷ Moreover, *tajdīd* and *islāh* cannot be meaningfully separated, just as the inner self and outer conduct of the individual may be said to be necessarily inter-twined. In the context of Malaysia, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) that emerged in 1971 drew much of its motivation from a combination of both *tajdīd* and *islāh*, that called for spiritual and moral transformation of individuals and visualised a more equitable and just society.²⁸

Islam is not concerned with personal spirituality alone, and unless this is manifested in the outer conduct of individuals and in societal relations, spirituality by itself can be subjective, misinterpreted, and even seen to be anti-social – as is often said regarding some of the Sufi movements. For mainstream Sufism, this integration of the inner spiritual self with outer conduct is in line with Islam’s over-arching principle of *tawḥīd*. Hence it is not difficult to see that *tajdīd* and *islāh* should be integral and a logical extension of one another.

Furthermore, *tajdīd* is not confined to traditional disciplines, such as theology, *fiqh*, or *ḥadīth* but also extends to science and technology, economics and other fields of learning that are meaningful for the revival of the *ummah* and Islamic civilisation. Another point of interpretation arising is whether it is the religion of the time in which the *mujaddid* lives that he is supposed to revive in the light of the conditions of that time, or that of the Islam that prevailed during the lifetime of the Prophet. The wording of the *ḥadīth* confirms the former meaning: The phrase ‘*yujaddid lahā dīnāhā*’ thus means that the *mujaddid* revives for the *ummah* the religion that they practice at the time when the *mujaddid* emerges. The *ḥadīth* did not say for instance ‘the religion of Allah, or of the Prophet Muhammad, or Islam as such,’ but visualised instead the religion that the *ummah* observes.²⁹ The *mujaddid*, to be sure, “is not out to create some past scenario in the history of the *ummah*. Rather he is to reapply the principles of Islam in their contemporary context so that the community is enabled to live and symbolise those ideals and principles.”³⁰

How should the phrase “every one hundred years” be understood in the *ḥadīth* under review? Many have understood it literally and engaged themselves with a series of minor issues as to whether the *mujaddid* is to appear at the end of the year that marks the end of a century or its beginning. What if someone died a week or month before the beginning of a century – thus precluding renowned imams like Mālik (d. 975), Abu Hanifah (d. 767) and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) simply because they did not fulfil those meticulous calculations. Others have added that the reference to a century may be no more than an indication of a period of time after which the Muslim community, or any human society for that matter, may require revitalisation. Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the rise and fall of civilisations, which takes about four generations, may give credence to such interpretation. The cyclical pattern of the ascendancy and decline of civilisations that Ibn Khaldun identifies is intimately related to the state of the arts and sciences, the depth and diversity or otherwise of crafts and industries and, most of all, good governance, especially its commitment to justice.³¹ The message of the *ḥadīth* may simply be that *tajdīd* will occur frequently enough to ensure that the Muslim community remains in touch with its roots. That God the Most High will send *mujaddids* whenever the *ummah* is in need of them, and it may indeed happen at any time or part of a given century.³² Some writers have highlighted the need for *mujaddids* in times of tumult and external aggression. To this effect, Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, the author of the renowned *Sunan* Abu Dawud, has recorded the *ḥadīth* of *tajdīd* as the first *ḥadīth* in his chapter on ‘tribulations and tumults’ (*kitāb al-malāḥim*).³³ As earlier noted, *tajdīd* presupposes a degree of stagnation characterised by the decline of society and degeneration. The *mujaddid* alerts and awakens them to their responsibilities and tries to rekindle in them a yearning to strive and change for the better.³⁴ Muslim individuals and groups must in this connection heed to the Qur’anic proclamation that “God will not change the condition of a people until they change that which is in themselves” (al-Ra’d, 13:11).

Many have mentioned ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 101/719), and Imam al-Shafi‘i (d. 205/895) as the *mujaddids* of the second and third *Hijrah* centuries, respectively. Many have also added Abū’l Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (d. 936 CE), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013 CE), and Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī who emerged at the head of the succeeding three centuries as the third, fourth and fifth *mujaddid* respectively. Only the first two names are, however, commonly quoted, but then due to the prevalence of the *madhhabs*, commentators have tended to refer to renowned names in the *madhhabs* only of their own following.³⁵

The emergence and crystallisation of *madhāhib* was a factor behind the prevalence of indiscriminate imitation (*taqlīd*) that contributed, in turn, to the so-called ‘closing of the door of *ijtihād*’ and suppression of the spirit of free inquiry and scholarship. Could this also mean that speaking of *tajdīd* at times

when *ijtihād* is suppressed and *taqlīd* dominates is not all that meaningful? This is not to say that *tajdīd* came to a standstill, as it actually did not, but scholars continued to speak of *tajdīd* of a limited type, often within the confines of their own schools of following.

Another question raised is: does the *ḥadīth* under review visualise a *mujaddid* for the whole of the *ummah*, or whether each country and community could have their own *mujaddids*? In response it is said that *tajdīd* for the renewal of Islam must in principle mean that it is meant to be for the whole of the *ummah*. Yet it is added, on a practical note, that due to the vast territorial domain of Islam, different regional and geographical segments of the *ummah* may have their own *mujaddids*.³⁶ The assertion, however, by some early commentators that the *ḥadīth* of *tajdīd* actually contemplated members of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*) as carriers of *tajdīd*, or *mujaddids*, is at odds with the general tenor of many other *ḥadīths* that speak of knowledge and erudition rather than the family and descent of scholars as such. Had the point over *ahl al-bayt* been a reliable interpretation, then the naming of certain figures, such as 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, al-Shafī'i and others, who were not from the *ahl al-bayt* would have not have materialised in the first place. In discussing this, one observer has even quoted a *ḥadīth* wherein the Prophet referred to Salman al-Farisi as one of his *ahl al-bayt*, as a gesture merely of closeness and affection even though he was not one of his family members as such.³⁷

Al-Qaraḏāwī has observed that *tajdīd* with reference to religion in the said *ḥadīth* implies a renewed understanding of the religion, reaffirmation of one's faith and a renewed commitment to the authentic principles of Islam. The basic message of the *ḥadīth*, he added, is inevitability of social change over the course of time, which is to be expected in every generation and century. Although the *ḥadīth* would appear to have contemplated the *hijrī* century and calendar, there is no objection if it is applied to an equivalent span of time using a different calendar. As for the question whether the beginning of a century should start with the birth date of the Prophet Muhammad, or his demise, Qaraḏāwī singled out the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Madinah as the most significant since it marked a new beginning in so many ways, and therefore the most appropriate starting point for *tajdīd*.³⁸ This also goes for the Islamic *Hijrī* calendar which commences from the event of the Prophet's migration.

Some commentators have further added combat of harmful innovation in religion (*kasr al-bid'ah*) to the understanding of *tajdīd*. This addition seems to have emerged following sectarian developments, such as that of the Kharijites, the Mu'tazilah and the *fiqhī* schools. The *ḥadīth* scholars then tried to bring in the notion of *bid'ah* within the purview of this *ḥadīth*. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it appears that *tajdīd* may involve combat of *bid'ah*, yet it is something

which may or may not be integral to its meaning. The Andalusian jurist, Ibrāhīm al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388), rightly observed that the *ḥadīth* contains a positive message and contemplates the common good and *maṣlahah* of the *ummah* generally.³⁹ The *ḥadīth* should not, in other words, be given a sectarian and factional interpretation. Commenting on al-Shāṭibī's observation, 'Ābid al-Jābirī also wrote that renewal and *tajdīd* in our time means finding practical solutions to the issues of common concern, issues that were not encountered in the past.⁴⁰

***Iṣlāḥ* and *Tajdīd*: 20th Century Developments**

Iṣlāḥ (reform) in the modern context, primarily refers to the works of 20th century scholars Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) and their mentor, Jamal al-Din al-Afghānī (d. 1897). The Qur'anic origins of *iṣlāḥ* signify the broader meanings of 'reconciliation', 'striving toward peace,' and 'pious action' as explained below.

Ṣalāḥ and *iṣlāḥ* in the Qur'an often refer to the general good of the people. The believers are thus called upon to engage themselves in righteous conduct - '*amal ṣāliḥ*', which may consist of that which is good and recommendable (*ma'rūf*) or which seeks to bring peace and reconciliation among people (*iṣlāḥ bayn al-nās*) (al-Nisā', 4:114). *Iṣlāḥ* may also consist of eradication of corruption, or *fasād*, which is the opposite of *iṣlāḥ* (al-A'rāf, 7:56). People's intention to achieve peace and *ṣalāḥ*, and not only their action, also earn them reward, for 'God certainly knows the *mufsid* (agent of corruption) from the *muṣliḥ* (agent of good)' (al-Baqarah, 2:220) and shall reward the *muṣliḥin* and all those engaged in God-ordained work of benefit to humankind (cf., al-A'rāf, 7:170).⁴¹

The intimate relationship between *iṣlāḥ* and *tajdīd* is underscored by the analysis that *tajdīd* for its own sake would mean little unless it is aimed ultimately at *iṣlāḥ*. It is further acknowledged that *iṣlāḥ* necessarily presents a challenge to the predominant religious, cultural and intellectual *status quo*. The potency of *iṣlāḥ-tajdīd* in Islamic history sprang from its scriptural origins and the evolving consensus that set the boundaries of orthodoxy. While stimulating evolution of the religious and cultural life of the *ummah*, the chief concern of the *tajdīd-iṣlāḥ* tradition was to preserve its unity and cohesion. In this spirit, an important aim of the reform project at the turn of the twentieth century had been to restore Muslim consensus. At the same time, it is conceded that twentieth century Islamic thought is no longer wholly internally generated, but is substantially influenced by, or consists of a reaction to, external challenges from western and non-western ideas and doctrines.⁴²

No consensus exists on a definition of *iṣlāḥ* in an Islamic context. This is partly because almost every sectarian movement has claimed to be the agent of *iṣlāḥ*. By some accounts, even the ultraconservative Wahhabiyah is considered

reformist, because it too aspired to purify the religion from harmful influences of innovations and to call for the original simplicity of early Islam. Muhammad ‘Abduh defined *iṣlāḥ* in a way that brings it closer to *tajdīd*. *Iṣlāḥ* is thus:

Liberating one’s thought from the shackles of *taqlīd* to understand religion in the way the predecessors of this *ummah* (*salaf*) did prior to emergence of disagreements - through direct recourse to the sources of Islam and in due regard also to the norms of rationality which God has endowed in the human intellect. It is to eliminate confusion and accomplish God’s messages for the preservation of humanity and world order.⁴³

This rather lengthy definition has invoked some criticism in its attempt to integrate traces of western modernity and rationalism in the fabric of *iṣlāḥ*. But even so, leading figures in the *iṣlāḥ* movement such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghānī, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (d.1899), ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d.1903) have all been critical of blind imitation of the West. In line with the teachings of Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubi (d.1198), al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh also refused to accept that reason is incompatible with *īmān* (belief), and held that the reformist movement would fail if Muslim clerics continued to preach the virtues of *taqlīd*. The proponents of *iṣlāḥ* also stressed the need for continuous *ijtihād* in their conviction that modern problems required modern answers.⁴⁴

The Salafiyah-cum-*iṣlāḥ* movement may be distinguished from Wahhabism in that the latter aimed at cleansing religious practice and thought from all its alien elements to save the Muslim people from divine wrath; they were opposed to all Sufi manifestations of Islam, and were more concerned with fighting *bid’ah* than with the positive aspects of reform. The movement also saw no need for reinterpretation of text or *ijtihād* to adapt to conditions of modern life.⁴⁵

The Abduh-Rida *iṣlāḥ* movement was subsequently divided into two branches, one of which leaned toward modernity (*al-hadāthah*), and the other toward revivalism of past precedent (*al-salafiyah al-iḥyā’iyah*). The first is associated with the thoughts mainly of twentieth century scholars Qassim Amin, Lutfi al-Sayyid, Husayn Haykal and the latter mainly with Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā. There remained a centrist *Iṣlāḥī* school of thought that was manifested in the works mainly of Muṣṭafā al-Maraghi, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rāziq, Mahmud Shaltut, ‘Abdullah Darrāz and others.⁴⁶

That said, Salafiyah, which is derived from *salaf* ‘pious ancestors’, is sometimes distorted and used, for instance, by al-Qaeda terrorists. Any such attribution should not mean, as Nasar Meer has correctly observed, that the Salafis are in any way associated with terrorism or even likely to be terrorists or extremists. Only a distorted meaning of Salafi can be applied in that context. Terrorists are, of course, to be judged by their conduct, regardless of association, whether real or alleged, with any particular movement.⁴⁷

Renewal and reform gained further traction after the fall of Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Some reformers, such as al-Afghānī and al-Kawakibi, associated renewal in religion with major political reform. There is emerging consensus, for instance, on the integration of the Qur'anic principle of *shūrā* (consultation) into governance, and its accountability to the electorate. Some reformers also sought to improve the status of women in society. Muhammad 'Abduh and Muhammad al-Ghazālī have, in principle, refused to attribute women's inequality to Islam but considered it to be the product of ignorance and misinterpretation of Islamic texts. The advocates of reform also stressed the revival of Islamic education, and the integration of scientific knowledge into the curricula of Islamic institutions of learning.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr has vindicated the primacy of *tajdīd* over *islāh*: *Tajdīd* has Islamic roots which *islāh* lacks. Nasr is of the view that it is *tajdīd* that is the fount of some of the most significant Islamic responses to the modern world.⁴⁸ The stronger scriptural roots of *tajdīd* are undeniable, yet on a broader note, it is reasonable to say that *tajdīd* and *islāh* complement one another. Looking at the wider spectrum of Islamic tenets and principles, *islāh* would appear to be integral, even if not based in a clear text, to the spirit and purport of the textual guidelines of Islam. Twentieth century discourse on *tajdīd* was actually precipitated by the *islāh* movement that started with al-Afghānī and 'Abduh.

The quest for knowledge has been made obligatory for Muslims, male and female, on the authority of *ḥadīth*. Islam is also assertive of an inherent link between knowledge and upright conduct (*'amal ṣāliḥ*), the command to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, the command to do justice - all total up into a dynamic prospect for *islāh* and *tajdīd* in the Muslim community. The intrinsic connection between *'ilm* and *islāh*, which is most emphasised in Islam, has also meant that the *mujaddid* must be an *'ālim* of some renown. A learned renewer should undoubtedly seek to enjoin the right and reject what is wrong, setting aright people's affairs, establishing justice among them, support truth against falsehood and the oppressed against oppressor.

A more recent articulation of the broader notion of *tajdīd-cum-islāh* in its contemporary context is found perhaps in the Mecca Declaration (December 2006) of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (now Cooperation) Summit of heads of states as follows:

All the governments and peoples of the *ummah* are unanimous in their conviction that reform and development are the priorities to which all efforts should be channelled within a framework that is intimately moulded in our Islamic social make-up. At the same time this framework needs to remain in harmony with the achievements of human civilisation and steeped in the principles of consultation, justice and equality in its drive to achieve good governance, widen political participation, establish the rule of law, protect human rights, apply social justice, transparency and accountability, fight corruption, and build civil society institutions.⁴⁹

Islamic Revivalism, Modernity and *Tajdīd*

Expressions such as ‘Islamic modernism’, ‘Islamic revivalism’ and ‘Islamic reform’ are embedded in the notions of *iṣlāh* and *tajdīd*. They are often attributed, as already mentioned, to al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh and Riḍā. Islamic modernism in the works of these and other thinkers sought to reconcile modern values such as constitutionalism, scientific investigation, modern methods of education, women’s rights, cultural revival, with the tenets and principles of Islam. Islamic revivalism of the latter part of the 20th century has had the effect of strengthening the affinity of *tajdīd* with the scriptural guidelines of Islam. Muhammad Iqbal’s seminal work, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, was translated into Arabic by Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqād in 1955, and ‘Abd al-Mutta‘āl Sa‘īdi’s work, *al-Mujaddidūn fī’l-Islām – min al-Qarn al-Awwal ilā’l-Rābi‘ ‘Ashar*, in the same year. Both expatiated on the scope and space that Islamic sources themselves provide for regeneration and renewal. Amin al-Khuli’s title, *al-Tajdīd fil-Dīn*, initially published as an article, and later as a book, also reflected on similar themes.

It is of interest to mention that al-Sa‘īdi’s previous book, published in the early 1950s, *Tarīkh al-Iṣlāh fī’l-Azhar* (history of reform in Al-Azhar) focused more on the concept of *iṣlāh* initiating in the meantime a call for a revolutionary reformer (*al-muṣliḥ al-thā‘ir*) but was almost totally silent on *tajdīd*, which then became the central theme of his subsequent book in 1955.⁵⁰ The main reason for this change of focus was the realisation firstly that western modernity had begun to penetrate and confuse *iṣlāh* with currents of opinion that did not enjoy Islamic credibility. Another reason was the spread of nationalism and secular ideologies during the post-colonial period that consisted mainly of political mottos. Added to this was the Arab defeat by Israel, and the tussle that followed between Islamic movements and governments in power in many Muslim countries. A climate of crisis prevailed and *iṣlāh* began to give way to *tajdīd* due mainly to the latter’s stronger grounding in the scripture.

Fazlur Rahman (d.1988) praised ‘Abduh for recognising the need for reform, just as he commended Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) and Abul A‘lā Mawdudi (d.1979) for countering the excesses of Islamic modernism and defending Islam against secularism. But he criticised them in the meantime for not having a ‘method’ and for the *ad hoc* nature of the solutions they proposed to major issues. Rahman tried, in turn, to articulate a new Islamic methodology, as he believed that traditional methods had fallen short of bringing Muslim thought into the intellectual framework of the modern age. He focused his attention on the Qur’an and on correct methodology of its interpretation in particular. Rahman’s mission may be summed up as an endeavour to retrieve the moral *élan* of the Qur’an in

order to formulate a Qur'an-centred ethic. For without an explicitly formulated ethical system, one can hardly do justice to Islam.⁵¹

Fazlur Rahman criticised the 'atomistic approach' of traditional scholarship. The methodology of the jurists also lacked a systematic and broad socio-ethical theory that he believed should underlie the law. Indeed, the jurists, in their quest to develop a highly structured legal system, missed out on the fluidity that could have been the result of such a theory.⁵² Rahman expounded as to how the Qur'anic guidance was intimately connected with the religious, political, economic and cultural life of the people of Hijaz, and more broadly the people of Arabia. However, this close connection was later disrupted by the lengthy disputations of Islamic theology and law, creating an ever-widening gap. Revelation came to be seen as historical and transcendent beyond the reach of humankind. The occasions of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) that played a vital role in explicating certain texts were marginalised and the link between *tafsīr*, *fiqh*, theology and the real life of Muslims was further weakened.⁵³ It is remarkable to note also that Muslim writings on ethics were mainly developed outside the *Sharī'ah* framework and were explicitly based on Greek and Persian sources.⁵⁴

In his writings on *tajdīd* in *fiqh*, Jamal al-Din Atiyah raised several issues that called for a review and renewal of *fiqh* in many areas. Beginning with devotional matters (*ibādāt*), Atiyah noted that too much emphasis is placed on ritual performances at the expense of the spiritual component of *ibādāt*. Whereas psychologists have spoken of the many beneficial psychological and character building effects of prayer and fasting, this is totally absent in *fiqh*. With regard to marriage, the Qur'an characterised it as "friendship and compassion – *mawaddah wa rahmah*," which the *fiqh* scholars have reduced to a contract of ownership (*'aqd al-tamlīk*), marking a total departure from that original Qur'anic spirit.⁵⁵ The emphasis in both *ibādāt* and contracts falls instead on formalities, pillars and conditions (*arkān wa shurūṭ*) in highly structured formulations that often compromise the essence and spirit of the subject.⁵⁶ Then again, Islam is a religion of unity (*tawhīd*), whereas the divisive impact of the *fiqh* schools, or *madhhabs*, on Muslim unity is either exaggerated or misunderstood. The schools of law were a manifestation of latitude in scholarly inquiry and *ijtihād*, but which lost focus and became an instrument of fanaticism and disunity among Muslims. In a similar vein, *fiqh* scholarship in the era of *taqlīd* became focused on details and took an atomistic approach to law at the expense of developing general theories and comprehensive guidelines. There is, moreover, a certain disconnect between *fiqh* and the beliefs and ethical norms of Islam and how all of these should be related to governance.⁵⁷

On a light note, Atiyah recounts what he had heard from al-Qaraḍāwī that as a youth in his early years in Egypt, he (Qaraḍāwī) attended the Ramadan lessons

at the local mosque in late evenings between the *maghrib* and ‘*ishā*’ prayers. The lessons were on ablution and cleanliness. Then Qaraḏāwī humorously added that “all the 30 nights we did not exit that one subject.” Compare this with the approach the Prophet p.b.u.h. took when a Bedouin came and asked him on how to perform the *ṣalāh*, and the Prophet simply said to him: “pray the way you see me praying.”⁵⁸

In his book *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fi Ṭarīq al-Tajdīd*,⁵⁹ Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa speaks of the stagnation of *fiqh* due to the longstanding hold of *taqlīd*, and raises a number of issues over which innovative responses are wanting. He also noted that the political jurisprudence (*al-fiqh al-siyāsī*, also *al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyah*) has failed to integrate the Qur’anic principles of *shūrā* and accountability. Al-‘Awa maintains that limiting the tenure of office of the head of state is no longer an option but a necessity, and that in many other areas, *fiqh* needs to be developed through comprehensive *ijtihād*: to provide relevant responses to issues of citizenship, freedom of association, political parties in the context of nation state, and peaceful relations with other states. Furthermore women’s right of participation in the political life of the community, their entitlement to act as judges and witnesses, and absolute equality in their right to life, as expounded in some scholastic works, were patently discriminatory - with reference, for example to blood money or *diyāh*. Similar questions arise over equality in respect of the fundamental rights of non-Muslims and *fiqh* formulations over the imposition of the poll tax (*jizyah*), Islam’s position on art and music, as well as issues in criminal law concerning apostasy and the law of evidence, especially methods of proof that need to be brought into line with modern and more reliable scientific means of establishing facts.

Salim al-‘Awa started his afore-mentioned book with a review of Jamal al-Banna’s book, entitled *Nahw Fiqh Jadīd* (Towards a new *fiqh*), and finds commonalities in their respective approaches to some of the challenging aspects of the renewal of *fiqh*. Al-‘Awa comments, however, on a point of difference between his own and al-Banna’s approach: whereas al-Banna seems to depart from the established methodologies on renewal and reform, al-‘Awa thinks that most of the issues can be addressed through the accepted Islamic methodologies of *ijtihād*.⁶⁰

The foregoing presents a fairly long list of issues that involve a healthy dose of self-criticism among Muslim scholars – the genesis one might say, of renewal and *tajdīd*. Some progress has been made on many of these through twentieth century family law reform legislation and scholarship, although progress is uneven in various countries and generally eclectic. Many of the authors I discussed have not only posed questions and raised issues but have also addressed them and deliberated over prospective solutions. Space does not permit details but I have

elsewhere attempted a fuller picture of the twentieth century Islamic law reform measures through statutory legislation, juristic doctrine and research.⁶¹ Twentieth century, 'Islamic resurgence' witnessed aspects of revivalism, that included both the *salafiyyah* type of revivalism, and that of modern reform through statutory legislation. However, one area that did not see tangible *tajdīd*-based improvement was constitutional law and government. But even here the Arab Spring, which is still unfolding, is likely to start a process of political reform where revivalist and innovative Islamic thought, democracy and human rights may blend and lead, hopefully to comprehensive changes, as opposed to haphazard importation of western laws and constitutions we have seen in the past, which have now come under fresh scrutiny and are likely to be amended and replaced.

The Relevance of *Maqāṣid*

The renewed interest in *maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*, the higher objectives of Islamic law, seen in Islamic thought and scholarship of recent decades has been a partial response to the textualist overtones of scholastic methodologies of interpretation and *ijtihād*. *Maqāṣid* has now become an accepted term of reference and criterion of a reformist idea and initiative. Whenever *tajdīd* introduces an initiative, plan or purpose which can be subsumed under the five essential *maqāṣid* (i.e. the *darūriyyāt*),⁶² its authenticity is most likely verified in that context. In the event, however, where an instance of *tajdīd* cannot be related to any of the recognised *maqāṣid* (objectives of the *sharī'ah*), it is submitted that one may apply a negative test, which is to say that *tajdīd* is valid if it does not contravene any of the immutable norms and principles of Islam. In this case, one would not need to produce affirmative evidence from the Islamic sources to prove the acceptability of *tajdīd*. The application of *tajdīd* to the dogma and basic pillars (*arkān*) of Islam is apparently limited. But since *tajdīd* can engage in matters outside this sphere and issues of concern to human relations and *mu'āmalāt* with greater flexibility, its relevance to the concerns of modernity and civilisational renewal is not difficult to see.

Linking the *maqāṣid* to *tajdīd* may be visualised with reference to economic development, which is not a juridical concept, nor is it a manifestly religious one, yet fighting poverty through economic development and realisation of equitable distribution of wealth are important aspects simultaneously of the *maqāṣid* and *tajdīd*. The Imāms al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī were of the view that Islamic thought must concern itself with the broader objectives of our religion and not solely with its prohibitive aspects, or to exclusively literalist interpretations.⁶³ This vision can best be achieved by drawing attention to the *maqāṣid* that are entirely goal-oriented, broader in scope, and capable of rising above particularities that can sometimes run in different directions and need to be made coherent in the light of *maqāṣid*.

Looked at from the opposite angle, the *maqāṣid* themselves can be developed through *tajdīd*. Some aspects of the *maqāṣid* that have remained underdeveloped could thus be developed through *tajdīd*-oriented research. This may be said of the role of rationality (*‘aql*) in the identification of *maqāṣid*, and whether or not the scope of the conventional enumeration of the essential *maqāṣid*, or *darūriyyāt*, can be widened to include other values and objectives that are clearly upheld in the scriptural sources. In a similar vein, two other categories of *maqāṣid*, namely the complementary (*hājīyyāt*) and embellishments (*taḥsīniyyāt*) may be wanting of better indicators and methodological refinements to minimise arbitrariness in their identification. Since I have elsewhere discussed this subject in fuller details,⁶⁴ suffice it to say here that a more important aspect of *tajdīd* relating to the *maqāṣid* would be to forge a closer nexus between the scriptural injunctions (*nuṣuṣ*) and their purposes, or *maqāṣid*. It is no longer enough, therefore, to extract a ruling (*ḥukm*) of *Shari‘ah* from a text in total isolation and neglect its purpose and objective.⁶⁵

A Critique of *Tajdīd*

The climate of crisis that dominated the post-colonial Muslim world also began to erode the credibility of *tajdīd*. Public opinion grew increasingly critical of the *tajdīd* movements in Turkey, for example, which saw the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate and the rise of questionable *tajdīd*-cum-*işlāh* groups, such as that of Atatürk with his westernised and secularist objectives - which Rashīd Riḍā later called as imitative *tajdīd* infected by western models. *Tajdīd* was seen no longer to be grounded in the Prophetic *ḥadīth* but in western modernity and thus of doubtful authenticity. Some even began to equate *tajdīd* with secularism, and others with pernicious innovation (*bid‘ah*) in the guise of Islam.⁶⁶

Twentieth century developments in the *tajdīd* discourse may be summarised into four clusters as follows:

1. Precedent-oriented *tajdīd* that mainly sought to address new issues through *ijtihād*. The advocates of this position linked *tajdīd* to past precedent, which was an important component also of the Salafiyah movement. Precedent is here understood not only to consist of text and scripture but also of schools, learned personalities and imams of the past, which evidently brought it closer to imitation and *taqlīd*, except that the advocates of this current remained open to *ijtihād*, albeit a restrictive and well-regulated *ijtihād*. Rashīd Riḍā, Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buṭī, and Mahmud al-Tahhan manifested this current of opinion.⁶⁷
2. Advocacy of open *ijtihād* (*al-ijtihād al-maftūḥ*) that read scripture and rationality side by side. Muhammad Iqbal, Abd al-Mutta‘āl Sa‘īdi, Amīn al-Khūli and Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwī manifested this current in their call for the

liberation of Islamic thought, advocacy of *Shari'ah* and *ijtihad* in tandem with modern realities and developments.

3. Islamisation of knowledge (*islāmiyāt al-ma'rifah*) and epistemological reform movement that sought to address a perceived crisis of civilisation (*azmat al-hadārah*) through methodological innovation and reform. This current of opinion is manifested by the Virginia-based International Institute of Islamic Thought ever since its inception in 1981. The Institute and its founders are critical of *taqlīdi* thought on the one hand and seeing the challenges of modernity through the lenses of western doctrines on the other. *Tajdīd* to the advocates of this current means reforming the methodologies of thought (*iṣlāḥ manāhij al-fikr*), which consist of two readings, namely reading of the scripture (*qirā'at al-naṣṣ*), and reading the existential reality (*qirā'at al-kawn*) side by side in the light of Islamic values. The focus is evidently on tools and methodologies more than on subject matter and content. Abd al-Hamīd Abu Sulayman, Tāhā Jābir al-'Alwāni, 'Imād al-Din Khalil, Muhammad Kamal Hassan and others manifested this current of opinion.⁶⁸
4. *Tajdīd*-cum-globalisation, which proposes a much wider understanding of *tajdīd* that is not tied to any particular methodology or framework but seeks to address the challenges of modernity in their own context. Globalisation has faced the Muslim world with challenges of civilisational proportions, hence efforts at renewal and *tajdīd* should accordingly be informed by the nature of the challenge and encapsulate its wider scope and dimensions. The advocates of this current include Muhammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, Abūl-Qasim Haaj Ahmad, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Muhammad al-Talbi and others who maintain that *tajdīd* movements of the past have failed to realise their objectives due mainly to their eclectic approaches to methodological issues, past heritage and modern developments, which read modern reality through the lenses mainly of religion and past heritage.

Muslim reformist movements, according to Malik Bennabi (d.1973), have suffered from poor planning and lack of direction. The result was a confusion of the two schools of thought, namely the modernists and the reformists. The first lost its way while journeying to the West searching for ready-made solutions to local problems, while the second remained servile to past glories, faithful to *status quo* and unable to penetrate the very causes of the malaise.⁶⁹ Another observer noted that Islam fell victim to parochialism and became reduced to a set of ritualistic performances that suppressed its broader civilisational objectives. "Unfortunately, purely non-civilisational issues" have occupied the agenda of many of the recent Islamic revivalist movements.⁷⁰ In a 2005 Cairo University conference on 'Dialogue of Civilisations' – *Ḥiwār al-Ḥadārāt*, Ṭāriq al-Bishrī observed that, "*mu'āṣarah* (modernism) in the Muslim usage of the post-colonial

period has on the whole been premised on western modernity and western civilisation. Muslims looked at themselves through western lenses.” Another commentator in the same event, Ibrāhīm al-Bayūmī, noted that “the modernity discourse among Islamic movements has largely consisted of approximation and comparison with the western model. The liberal secularist movements have uncritically taken that model for their own agendas”.⁷¹ This is illustrated in the works of Qassim Amin, who advocated gender equality under the influence of ‘Abduh’s ideas, but it soon succumbed to the currents of western modernity such that its Islamic credentials became increasingly overshadowed by western thought.

Civilisational Renewal (*Tajdīd Haḍārī*)

How do we understand the notion of civilisational renewal in Islam is the question I address next.

Islamic teachings convey on the whole a certain awareness and insight into one’s inner self and outer environment, informed and enlightened in the meantime by a set of principles and sound human reason. The external dimension of this awareness is a civilisational mission pertaining to relations among human individuals and communities and how they relate, in turn, to their earthly habitat and living environment. This is the focus of Islam’s teachings on the vicegerency of man in the earth (*istikhlāf fi ‘l-ard*) and his responsibility to build it and create a just social order that is ethically grounded and enriched by the spirit of beneficence (*ihsān*). Islamic teachings also expound the notions of reminding (*dhikr*), good advice (*naṣīḥah*), and the perennial struggle, or jihad, for self improvement and that of the society in which one lives, and then of course, *iṣlāh* and *tajdīd*. Reminding and good advice are deemed necessary as the values just mentioned can fall prey to human forgetfulness and neglect. Since the carrier of *tajdīd* is a reminder of that which is a religious obligation and “calls attention to the civilisational vision of Islam, then *tajdīd* is both a religious and a practical necessity of Islam.”⁷²

The idea of conscious awareness of the theocentric core of Islamic teachings is conveyed in the Qur’an as follows:

Say [O Prophet]: this is my way, resting upon conscious insight accessible to reason (*‘alā baṣīratin*), I am calling you all to God – both I and those who follow me (Yusuf, 12:108).

The ‘calling to God’ enunciated by the Prophet, is described in this verse as the outcome of a conscious insight and conviction, accessible to, and verifiable by the light of reason, which also manifests Qur’an’s approach to the religion itself. Conscious awareness must mean integrating an inner awakening of the believer with his outer conduct and role he is to play in a continuous quest for societal improvement.

Civilisational renewal is broad and comprehensive, and so is the role of *tajdīd* therein, which must be rich in content and comprehensive. *Tajdīd* may also be broad or address only those aspects of civilisation that are wanting of renewal. As already noted, *tajdīd* is inclusive of the whole of the Muslim community and not confined to particular groups and regions thereof. It is also not confined to any particular sphere of the religion but is inclusive of the whole of Islam. *Tajdīd* may thus address devotional matters and aspects of Islamic beliefs (*‘ibādah* and *‘aqīdah*), although not in an essentialist sense, but in the sense of removing unwarranted accretion and deviation from them, and also of attaining greater levels of refinement in the integration of rational thought with the essence of belief and worship. If religious practices have become too ritualistic to the extent of isolating their meaning and spirit, then renewal may evidently be wanting. Similarly, if uncertainty in the impact of secularist modernity and science raises questions over their acceptability or otherwise from the Islamic viewpoint, then *islāh* and *tajdīd* may well play that role.⁷³

Tajdīd and *islāh* are not confined, as earlier noted, to a particular time segment and may be attempted when manifest neglect or deviation from the norms of Islam are noted. Without suggesting a monopoly of any group over these ideas, it is important to note, nevertheless, that *tajdīd*, *islāh* and *ijtihād* in specialised areas and issues are undertaken by the experts, be it individuals or bodies and institutions, in line with the Qur’anic address to the believers to: “Ask those who know if you know not yourselves” (al-Naḥl, 16:43). This is particularly relevant in our time when specialisation of disciplines has become ubiquitous. *Tajdīd* and *ijtihād* in matters of concern to *Sharī‘ah* should integrate the *nuṣuṣ* and *aḥkām* (text and ruling) with their valid purposes and *maqāsid* - as earlier noted. Islamic civilisation grounded in moderation is in line with the Qur’anic vision of *wasatīyyah* (cf., al-Baqarah, 2:143),⁷⁴ just as it is universalist and inclusive, viewing the whole of humanity as a single brotherhood. Islamic civilisation is also evolutionary such that renewal and reform are contemplated in tandem with the actual needs and benefits (or *maṣlaḥah*) of the people. This should also be informed by the Qur’anic guidelines on compassion (*raḥmah*) and wisdom (*ḥikmah*). Two other important dimensions of this vision are impartial justice, and as already noted, that of being good to others (*al-‘adl wa’l-iḥsān*).

I now summarise the various dimensions of civilisational renewal in Islam especially in its relationship with other major civilisations:

1. Reciprocating with what is better. This is based on the Qur’anic dicta that “Good and bad can never be equal. Respond to evil in a way that is better, then the one who was a foe will become as if he were an intimate friend” (Fuṣṣilat, 41:34). This is an important guideline for the Islamic vision of dealing with

the different Other – indeed an excellent guideline to peaceful coexistence and cooperation in mutually beneficial works.⁷⁵

2. Recognition and advocacy of pluralism in the cultural, political, and socio-legal components of civilisation. This is based on the Qur’anic declaration and guideline “To each of you We have assigned a law and an open way. If God had so willed, He would have made you a single nation, but His plan is to test you in what you have been given. So vie with one another in pursuit of virtues...” (al-Mā’idah, 5:48; see also al-Ḥujurāt, 49:13).
3. Developing beneficial cooperation and exchange with other communities and civilisations. The possibilities of such cooperation (*ta’awun*) are extensive in the spheres particularly of science and commerce, environmental care, campaign against terrorism and violence, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Relations with non-Muslim communities and nations should primarily be guided by rationality rather than scriptural and *Shari’ah* specifications.
4. Enhancing and further developing the jurisprudence of minorities (*fiqh al-aqaliyyāt*) for minority Muslims in non-Muslim majority countries. This should be based on the Qur’anic principle that “God does not burden any soul beyond its capacity” (al-Baqarah, 2:233) and its directives on removal of hardship (*raf’ al-ḥaraj*). This also implies a certain commitment to common citizenship for minorities in Muslim majority countries in line with the principle of equality before the law, and that of reciprocal treatment (*mu’āmalah bi’-mithl*) with the larger community as well as relations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries worldwide.
5. Civilisation is normally concerned with beauty, art and culture, hence the advice of accentuating the beauty-enhancement values (*al-qiyam al-jamīliyyah*) of Islam. References abound in the Qur’an to earth’s unlimited potential for growth of beautiful flora and fauna, gardens and rivers, and the God-enjoined beauty in birds, animals and marine life. Instructive in this regard are also two renowned *ḥadīths* we may quote: “God is beautiful and He loves beauty;” and “Truly God has inscribed beauty upon everything.” Thus it is for us to exert ourselves to discover and manifest it among ourselves and in our relations with other communities and civilisations.
6. Unwavering commitment to the advancement of equality, freedom, human rights, gender justice and protection of the human dignity of women. We also call attention to vindication of the ethical norms and dimensions of civilisation that are all too often neglected and marginalised.⁷⁶
7. A resolute stand and commitment to the elimination of sectarian conflict among the Sunni and Shi’ah followers of Islam. This is a call for taking all-round measures to make the Qur’anic vision that “Verily the believers are

brethren; so make peace among your brothers,” (al-Ḥujurāt, 49:10) a reality of relations among all Muslim communities and nations. The essence of this theological unity is evidenced by the truism that all the six articles of faith (*īmān*), and those of five pillars (*arkān*) of Islam are identical among the Sunni and Shi’ah followers of Islam.

I may also add a note on the Kuala Lumpur based International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS), which started operation as an Islamic think-tank in October 2008.⁷⁷ IAIS is a non-governmental Institute for advancing research on Islam and contemporary issues. The Institute embraced the basic vision of civilisational renewal (*tajdīd ḥadārī*) that aims at widening the scope of the revivalist discourse of the closing decades of the 20th century from its exceedingly narrow focus on *fiqh* issues, mannerisms, what Muslims wear and what they eat etc. – issues that are hardly representative of the wider concern of the *ummah* over the broader themes and objectives of Islamic civilisation. Scant attention was thus paid to issues of justice and good governance, poverty eradication, science, technology and the environment as well as Islam’s relation with other civilisations – issues that now constitute the main research agenda of IAIS Malaysia. The Institute publishes a quarterly refereed journal, “*Islam and Civilisational Renewal*” dedicated to contemporary and policy relevant research and serves as a platform of advancing public debates, conferences and seminars.⁷⁸

Conclusion and Recommendations

Notwithstanding the somewhat disconcerting currents of opinion that afflicted Islamic thought in the post-colonial period, it is clear that “the *tajdīd* potential is a permanent feature of the *ummah* from its inception to the end of time ... The potential may be dampened or heightened by a number of factors but it remains in the community precisely because its ingredients are contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah.”⁷⁹ Even in the seemingly westernised Muslim societies of today, the potential of *tajdīd* is not lacking. The complexity of our contemporary society may modify the role of the ‘*ālim-mujaddid*, as the very agenda of *tajdīd* and the business of reordering and running a state today require a variety of inputs from technocrats and professionals as well as the ‘*ulamā*’. But the quest for *tajdīd* and the *ummah*’s capacity to attempt it is clearly borne out by the emergence of Islamic revivalist movements in many Muslim countries. “There is clearly a latent energy for *tajdīd* in every Muslim community even those that may appear to have strayed away from the centre.”⁸⁰

Modern scholarship has evidently widened the scope of *tajdīd* to matters outside the established text and precedent. This is a consequence partly of Islam’s encounters with modernity and the nature of the challenges the *ummah*

has to face in the era of globalisation. Issues of authenticity and verification of ideas presented in the name of *işlāh* and *tajdīd* have always been the focus of scholarly attention and discourse. The concern over adherence to past precedent became exaggerated and overemphasised at the expense often of narrowing down the scope of the reformist discourse. The challenge that remains, and one that demands persistent engagement of Muslim thought leaders, is one of establishing a correct balance of emphasis between valid yet also sometimes conflicting pulls of Islamic authenticity, and the formation of adequate responses to contemporary issues. The challenges of good governance, economic development, science and technology, for example, cannot be wholly addressed through looking at past precedent nor through the lenses of law and religion. Broader issues of science and civilisation also impress the need for more diversified responses that do not, in the meantime, contravene Islamic values. I now propose the following:

- The foregoing analysis has shown that *tajdīd* is an important instrument of achieving renewal and social progress in harmony with religious principles. Yet it is a broad and comprehensive concept that should not be reduced by narrow technicalities and restrictive interpretations.
- The Islamic discourse on renewal and *tajdīd* has moved in tandem with the prevailing conditions of history and time. It has exhibited internal diversity and scope to meet new challenges. We have shown that the relatively open understanding of *tajdīd* to begin with was subsequently subjected to restrictions with the crystallisation of the leading schools of theology and law. Twentieth century *tajdīd*-related discourse was inclined to look to new horizons but then entered the tense environment of confrontation with western modernity and internationally challenging conditions. Yet the *tajdīd* discourse has moved on and may now be beginning to regain its momentum. *Tajdīd* has thus become wider, more engaging and no longer a responsibility only of individual *mujaddids*, but also of movements and thought leaders of society and politics, educationists, mainstream media and the international community. *Tajdīd* should now be considered in this wider context and no longer seen as the prerogative exclusively of individuals and *mujaddids*.
- *Tajdīd* and *işlāh* complement one another in the sense that renewal and regeneration is attempted when there is neglect, or indeed misunderstanding and distortion of the principles of Islam. *Tajdīd* would thus necessitate corrective action and reform by way of *işlāh* and pave the way for a renewed vision of Islam in imaginative ways. *Tajdīd* and *işlāh* should as such be seen as complementary and mutually supportive.
- *Tajdīd* should also be complemented by *ijtihād*. Whereas *tajdīd* is not regulated by a methodology of its own, *ijtihād* and its sub-varieties are enriched by the

elaborate methodology of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Without proposing that *tajdīd* should be subsumed under *ijtihād*, it should nevertheless draw support from its resources. *Tajdīd* should draw inspiration, as far as possible, directly from the Qur'an and Sunnah, but also from the broader vision of the *maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*. The principles and methodologies of *ijtihād* should, in a similar vein, complement the application of *tajdīd* to juridical issues.

- *Tajdīd* is not a *fiqhi* theme nor can it be subsumed by the particularities of any one discipline. It is multi-disciplinary and draws inspiration and support from all areas of Islamic learning, and those of the modern sciences, that do not contravene Islamic values. This multidisciplinary approach to *tajdīd* should now be accorded greater recognition.
- One ought to be guarded against syncretism and mixing of discordant Islamic and secularist doctrines that originate in differential philosophies and outlooks. Superficial compatibility is not a substitute for genuine harmony. Only this latter can offer potential for growth whereas plausible compatibility is short-lived and can even sow the seeds of conflict, which should be avoided. While we recommend a broader view of *tajdīd*, we also warn against attempts that confuse syncretism and specious accretions with authentic *tajdīd*.
- *Tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ* need not be confined to legalities but look at the broader picture of Islamic civilisational objectives, the neglected aspects of accountability and good governance, poverty eradication and Islam's relations with other civilisations.
- The Islamic fundamentalist discourse of the twentieth century, although not internally monolithic, has narrowed down, nevertheless, the horizons of debate on revivalism and reform. This is partly caused by western colonialism and military aggression. It will be difficult to realise equilibrium and balance of the Islamic discourse in a climate of tension, heightened Islamophobia, and mainstream media bias against Islam. What we are saying is that *tajdīd* prospers in a peaceful environment. When turbulent politics, extremism and violence overwhelms the social climate *tajdīd* is likely to decline. Genuine *tajdīd* benefits from a conducive environment of normality and peace, which should be the common objective and responsibility of both the Islamic and western thought leaders and governments.
- Muslims should join hands with other communities and nations to address the common problems of human trafficking, drug use and disease, moral depravity and oppression through innovative solutions that may well partake in *tajdīd*. *Tajdīd* in the era of globalisation may thus acquire international dimensions and generate common solutions for Muslims and non-Muslims together.

Notes

- * *Mohammad Hashim Kamali*, Founding Chairman and CEO of IAIS Malaysia, graduated from Kabul University, and took his PhD in Islamic and Middle Eastern Law at the University of London in 1969. Professor Dr M.H. Kamali served as Professor of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM, 1985–2007), then Dean of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). He also held Visiting Professorships at McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies; Capital University, Ohio; and the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin. A member of the Constitution Review Commission of Afghanistan (2003), he has provided expert legal consultation to the new constitutions of Iraq, the Maldives and Somalia. Eminent authority on Islamic legal studies, he has published over 150 academic articles and 35 texts, including standard textbooks at universities worldwide.
1. Cf., John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in John L Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 32f.
 2. Ibn Manzur al-Ifriqi, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, vol. 2, p. 202; and Muhammad ibn Abu Bakar al-Razi, Muhktar al-Sihah, p. 95 – as quoted in ‘Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *al-Tajdīd fī l-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Beirut: Dar ibn al-Jawzi, 2001, p. 19.
 3. Ibn/ Hajar al-‘Asqalani, *Tawāli al-Ta’sīs li-ma’āli Muhammad ibn Idrīs* – as quoted in Abd al-Rahman al-Haaj Ibrahim, “al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ‘ala’l-Khiṭāb: Bahth fi Tārīkhīyāt al-Mafhūm al-Tajdīd,” *al-Tajdid*, Kuala Lumpur: IIUM, vol. 3, no. 61420/1999, 100.
 4. Jalal al-Dīn al-Suyuti, *al-Jāmi’ al-Ṣaghīr* – as quoted in ‘Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *al-Tajdīd fī l-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Beirut: Dar ibn al-Jawzi, 2001, p. 19.
 5. Al-Mubarak bin Muhammad al-Jazari Ibn al-Athir, *Jāmi’ al-Uṣūl li-Aḥādīth al-Rasūl*, ed. Abd al-Qadir al-Arnaut, 3rd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1983, vol. 11, p. 321.
 6. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Liqā’āt wa Ḥiwārāt Ḥawl Qaḍāyā al-Islām wa’l-‘Aṣr*, Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1992, 85-86.
 7. Abd al-Rahman al-Haaj Ibrahim, “al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ‘ala’l-Khiṭāb: Bahth fi Tārīkhīyāt al-Mafhūm al-Tajdīd,” *al-Tajdid*, Kuala Lumpur: IIUM, vol. 3, no. 61420/1999, 115.
 8. Hasan al-Turabi, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 2nd ed., Jeddah: al-Dār al-Su’ūdiyyah lil-Nashr, 1978, p.176, also p. 32.
 9. Ibrahim, “al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ,” 125.
 10. Ibid., 103.
 11. Usman Muhammad Bugagie, Concept of Revitalisation in Islam (unpublished PhD thesis), <http://dar-sirr.com/Tajdid.html>, p. 5.
 12. Muhammad ‘Imarah, Azmat, “*al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Mu’āsir*,” Cairo: Dar al-Shurūq al-Awsaṭ, 1990, 85 and 83.
 13. Aḥmad Ṣidqī al-Dajānī, “*Afkār fī l-taghyīr*,” published by the Ministry of Awqāf and Islamic Affairs of the State of Kuwait (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Awqāf, 1955), 20.
 14. See for details ‘Abd al-Sattar al-Sayyid, “al-Tajdīd fī l-Fikr al-Islāmī: Mashrū’iyyatuh wa Ḍawābiṭuh,” in ed. Mahmud Hamdi Zaquzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 2009/1430, p. 364f.
 15. Cf., Abu Bakr al-Rafiq, “al-Tajdīd wa Ahammiyyatuh fī l-‘Aṣr al-Ḥadīth,” in

- ed., *Zaqzuq*, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 603.
16. Cf., ‘Ammar al-Talibi, “al-Tajdīd fī’l-Fikr al-Mālik Bin Nabī,” in ed., *Zaqzuq*, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 863.
 17. Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, *Ḥawl Qadāyā al-Islām wa’l-‘Aṣr* (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 1427 AH/2006, 3rd ed.), 89.
 18. *Ibid.*, 85.
 19. ‘Abd Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī, *Mishkāṭ al-Maṣābīḥ*, ed. by Muḥammad Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Albānī (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1399 AH/1979, 2nd ed.), vol. I, *ḥadīth* no. 247. This is a collection of verified *ḥadīths* from all the six major books of *ḥadīth*, known as *Al-Kutub al-Sittah*. See also for an analysis of this *ḥadīth* and its significance for civilisational renewal Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Civilisational Renewal: Revisiting the Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2nd ed. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, 2009, 51ff.
 20. Usman Muhammad Bugage, *Concept of Revitalisation in Islam* (unpublished PhD thesis), <http://dar-sirr.com/Tajdid.html>, pp. 2-3.
 21. Cf., ‘Adnan Muhammad Imamah, *al-Tajdīd fī’l-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Beirut: Dar ibn al-Jawzi, 2001, 17.
 22. Muhammad Shams al-Din ‘Azimabadi (d.1858 CE), *‘Awn al-Ma’būd Sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, vol. 11, p. 391, as quoted in ‘Adnan Imamah, p. 17.
 23. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rauf al-Manāwī, *Fayz al-Qadīr*, vol. 2, p. 357 as quoted in ‘Adnan Imamah at p. 17.
 24. Ṣūfī Abū Ṭālib, “Al-Tajdīd wa Ḍarūrat al-tawāzun”, conference paper presented to the Third International Forum of al-Azhar Alumni (Kuala Lumpur, 16 February 2008), 5.
 25. Muhammad Mas‘ad Yaqut, “Naẓarāt fī Ḥadīth al-Tajdīd: fī Hādha’l-Qarn Na’tājula Ḥarakah Tajdīdiyyah Shāmilah Mustanirah,” <http://saaid.net/aldawlah/359.htm>, p. 2-3 (accessed 26 August 2012).
 26. Cf., ‘Adnan Imamah, *al-Tajdīd fī’l-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 26f.
 27. Osman Bakar’s seminar paper “Religious Reform and the Controversy Surrounding Islamization in Malaysia”, presented at a forum on “Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia” at the National University of Singapore (5-6 March 2008), 4.
 28. *Ibid.*, 7. Osman Bakar adds that in conformity with its combined understanding of *tajdīd* and *iṣlāḥ*, ABIM proposed an educational programme that combined spiritual renewal and social reform for the realisation of social justice. ABIM of the 1970s was a unique Islamic revivalist movement that significantly impacted the Malaysian society of its time.
 29. Muhammad Yaqut, *Naẓarāt fī Ḥadīth al-Tajdīd*, *ibid.*, 4.
 30. Usman Bugaje, “Concept of Revitalisation,” 5.
 31. Cf., ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Hamid Ahmad Zahir, Cairo: Dar al-Fajr li’l-Turath, 2004/1425, 483 and passim.
 32. Cf., Bugaje, “Concept of Revitalisation”, 4.
 33. Cf., Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanfuri, *Badhl al-Majhūd fī Ḥall Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, ed. Taqī al-Dīn al-Nadwī, *Kitāb al-Malāḥim*, bāb mā yudhkaru fī qarn al-mi’atah, Beirut: Sharikah Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyah, 1427/2006, vol. 12, 335.
 34. *Ibid.*, 5; al-Haaj Ibrahim, “*al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ*,” 104.
 35. Some have said that it is the end of the century that is taken into account. For ‘Umar ibn Abd al-‘Aziz, who is the first *mujaddid*, only died at the head of

- second century thus emerging at the end of the first. This will also account for the fact that the first century AH was headed by the Prophet himself – hence the view that it is the end of that century we start with.
36. Taqī al-Dīn al-Nadwī has thus drawn the conclusion that correct understanding of the *ḥadīth* does not confine *tajdīd* either to one individual or to one particular community and place, and that it is equally open to plurality in its implications.
 37. The *ḥadīth* thus simply mentioned that “Salman is one of us, an *ahl al-bayt* – *Salmān minnā ahl al-bayt*.” Cf., ‘Isam Ahmad al-Bashir, “al-Tajdīd fī’l-Fikr al-Islāmī,” in ed., *Zaḥẓuq*, Tajdīd al-Fikr, 91.
 38. Yūsuf al-Qaraḏāwī, *Ummatunā Bayna Qarnayn* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1427 AH/2006, 3rd ed.), 10; idem, *Min Ajli Ṣaḥwah Rāshidah: Tajaddud al-Dīn wa Tanahhud ’l-Dunyā*, Cairo: Dar al-Shurūq, 1421/20001, 13.
 39. Shīrīn Ḥamīd Fahmī, “Manzūrunā al-Islāmī al-Ḥaḏārī,” <http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/contemporary/2005/09/article04.html>. See also al-Haaj Ibrahim, “*al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ*,” 102.
 40. Muḥammad ‘Abīd al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīn wa’l-dawlah wa taṭbīq al-sharī’ah* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabīyyah, 1996), 133.
 41. See for a discussion John Voll as in note, no. 1.
 42. Cf., Suha Taji –Farouki, ed. *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an*, London: 2004, OUP and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, p. 18 (Introduction).
 43. Muhammad ‘Imarah, “Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī ‘inda Muhammad ‘Abduh wa Madrasatuh,” *Kitāb al-Hilal*, no. 360, Cairo, 1980, pp. 40-69.
 44. Cf., As’ad Abu Khalil, “Revival and Renewal” in ed. John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, OUP, 1995, p. 432f.
 45. Ibid.
 46. Cf., ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Haaj Ibrahim, “al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ ‘ala’l-Khiṭāb: Bahth fī Tārīkhīyāt al-Mafhūm al-Tajdīd,” *al-Tajdīd*, Kuala Lumpur: IIUM, vol.3, no.6 1420/1999, 106.
 47. Nasar Meer, “Complicating ‘Radicalism’- Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Identity in Britain,” *Arches Quarterly* (London) Vol.5, Spring 2012, p. 15.
 48. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 92.
 49. “Makkah al-Mukarramah Declaration”, *Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference* (5-7 Dhū’l Qa’idah 1426 AH/7-8 December 2005), 3.
 50. Al-Haaj Ibrahim, “al-Tajdīd: min al-Naṣṣ,” 109.
 51. Abdullah Saeed, “Fazlur Rahman: a framework for interpreting the ethico-legal content of the Qur’an,” in ed. Suha Taji Farouki, ed. *Modern Muslim intellectuals and the Qur’an*, London: OUP and the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2004, 42-43.
 52. Ibid., 44.
 53. Ibid., 48.
 54. Ibid., 52.
 55. Jamal al-Din Atiyah and Wahbah al-Zuhaili, *Tajdīd al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2002/1422, 31-32.
 56. Ibid., 35.
 57. Ibid., 35.
 58. Ibid., 46.
 59. Muhammad Salim al-Awa, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī Tārīq al-Tajdīd*, Cairo: al-Maktab

- al-Islāmī, 2nd ed., 1998/119, 272pp.
60. Ibid., 20-222.
 61. Mohammad Hashim Kamali: *Sharī'ah Law: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008, Ch. 12, Adaptation and Reform, 246-262.
 62. The five essential *maqāsid* are protection of life, religion, human intellect, property and family. A sixth item added to this list is personal dignity or honour. See for further detail on *maqāsid*, M. H. Kamali, *Sharī'ah Law: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008, Ch. 6, 123-140.
 63. Ibid., 40-41.
 64. Cf., Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Sharī'ah Law: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oneworld publications, 2008, Chapter six on "History and Methodology of Maqasid." See also idem, *Maqasid, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal*, London & Kuala Lumpur: IIIT and IAIS Malaysia, 2012. See also 'Ali Jum'ah, "Tajdīd Uṣūl al-Fiqh," in *Zaqzuq, Tajdīd al-Fikr*, 357f.
 65. Cf., Isam al-Bashir, "al-Tajdīd fī'l-Fikr al-Islāmī," in ed., *Zaqzuq, Tajdīd al-Fikr*, 94.
 66. Ibid., 111-112.
 67. Ibid., 113-114.
 68. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, *Azmat al-'Aql al-Muslim*, Virginia: al-Ma'had al-'Ālami li'l-Fikr al-Islāmī, 3rd ed. 1994, p. 40; Taha Jabir al-'Alwani, *Iṣlāh al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Madkhal ilā Nizām al-Khiṭāb al-Islāmī al-Mu'āṣir*, Virginia: al-Ma'had al-'Ālami li'l-Fikr al-Islāmī, 3rd ed., 1995, 72-73.
 69. Fawzia Barium, *Malik Bennabi, His Life and Theory of Civilisation*, Kuala Lumpur: Budaya Ilmu, 1993, 163-164.
 70. Maimul Ahsan Khan, *Human Rights in the Muslim World*, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003, 58.
 71. Ibid.
 72. Sheikh 'Abd al-Ghani 'Ashur, then Acting Sheikh of al-Azhar, "Manhaj al-Ta'āmul ma' al-Qur'ān wa'l-Sunnah," in ed. Mahmud Zaqzuq, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, 636.
 73. Cf., Isam al-Bashir, "al-Tajdīd fī'l-Fikr, in ed., *Zaqzuq, Tajdīd al-Fikr*, 94f.
 74. Moderation (*wasatiyyah*) will thus discourage exaggeration even in religiosity, too much legalism, sufi practices, and the like. See for details Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Moderation and Balance in Islam: The Qur'anic Principle of Wasatiyyah*, Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia, 2010.
 75. Ibid.
 76. Ibid., 95- 96.
 77. The present writer is currently the Founding Chairman and Senior Fellow of IAIS Malaysia.
 78. See for details IAIS Malaysia website at www.iais.org.my. IAIS has published about seventy publications since its inception in 2008.
 79. Usman Bugaje, "Concept of Revitalization," 5.
 80. Ibid.